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Abstract. We continue the investigations initiated in the recent papers
(Brown et al. in The modal logic of Bayesian belief revision, 2017; Gyenis
in Standard Bayes logic is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable, 2018) where Bayes
logics have been introduced to study the general laws of Bayesian belief
revision. In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises (updates)
his prior belief by conditionalizing the prior on some evidence using the
Bayes rule. In this paper we take the more general Jeﬀrey formula as a
conditioning device and study the corresponding modal logics that we
call Jeﬀrey logics, focusing mainly on the countable case. The contain-
ment relations among these modal logics are determined and it is shown
that the logic of Bayes and Jeﬀrey updating are very close. It is shown
that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a
ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite set of elementary propositions is not finitely
axiomatizable. The signiﬁcance of this result is that it clearly indicates
that axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be severely limited.
Mathematics Subject Classiﬁcation. Primary 03B42, 03B45; Secondary
03A10.
Keywords. Modal logic, Bayesian inference, Bayes learning, Bayes logic,
Jeﬀrey learning, Jeﬀrey conditionalization.
1. Background and Overview
This paper continues the investigations initiated in the recent papers [7,11]
where Bayes logics have been introduced to study the modal logical properties
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of statistical inference (Bayesian belief revision) based on Bayes conditional-
ization.
Suppose (X,B, p) is a probability space where the probability measure
p describes knowledge of statistical information of elements of B. In the ter-
minology of probabilistic belief revision one says that elements in B stand for
the propositions that an agent regards as possible statements about the world,
and the probability measure p represents an agent’s prior degree of beliefs in
the truth of these propositions. Belief revision is about to learn new pieces
of information: Learning proposition A ∈ B to be true, the agent revises his
prior p on the basis of this evidence and replaces p with some new probability
measure q (often called posterior) that can be regarded as the probability mea-
sure that the agent infers from p on the basis of the information (evidence)
that A is true. This transition from p to q is what is called statistical infer-
ence. We say in this situation that “q can be learned from p”1 and that “it is
possible to obtain/learn q from p”. This clearly is a modal talk and calls for
a logical modeling in terms of concepts of modal logic. Indeed, the core idea
of the paper [7] was to look statistical inference as an accessibility relation
between probability measures: the probability measure q can be accessed from
the probability measure p if for some evidence A we can infer from p to q. (For
more motivation on how exactly modal logic come to the picture we refer to
the introduction of [7]).
But how do we get q? One possible answer is a fundamental model of
statistical inference, the standard Bayes model that relies on Bayes condition-
alization of probabilities: given a prior probability measure p and an evidence
A ∈ B the inferred measure q is deﬁned by conditionalizing p upon A using
the Bayes rule:
q(H) .= p(H | A) = p(H ∩ A)
p(A)
(∀H ∈ B) (1.1)
provided p(A) = 0. When q can be obtained from p using Bayes conditional-
ization upon some evidence A we say that q is Bayes accessible from p. The
paper [7] studied the logical aspects of this type of inference from the perspec-
tive of modal logic and also hints that a similar analysis could be carried out
when Bayes accessibility is replaced by the more general accessibility based on
Jeﬀrey conditionalization.
Indeed, Bayesian belief revision is just a particular type of belief revision:
Various rules replacing the Bayes rule have been considered in the context of
belief change, and one important particular type is Jeﬀrey conditionalization
(see [9,32]). Jeﬀrey conditioning is a way of inferring to a new probability q
from the prior probability p and from an uncertain evidence ri assigned to a
1 This terminology is common in the literature of machine learning or artiﬁcial intelligence [3,
22], and it might be slightly confusing because one also says the “Agent learns the evidence”.
But the conceptual structure of the situation is clear: The Agent’s “learning” q means the
Agent infers q from some evidence (using conditionalization as inference device, see later).
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ﬁnite2 partition {Ei}i<n of X (ri ≥ 0,
∑
i<n ri = 1, p(Ei) > 0) by making use
of the Jeﬀrey rule:
q(H) .=
∑
i<n
p(H | Ei)ri (1.2)
Jeﬀrey conditioning provides a more general method than Bayesian condi-
tioning: if we assume that an element of the partition becomes certain (i.e.
ri = 1 for some index i), then the Jeﬀrey rule (1.2) reduces to the Bayes rule
q(H) = p(H | Ei). On this basis the Bayes rule is a special case of the Jeﬀrey
rule. Taking the Jeﬀrey rule as an inference device gives rise to what we call
Jeﬀrey accessibility: we say that q can be Jeﬀrey accessed from p if q can be
obtained from p using (1.2) with some uncertain evidence. The aim of the
current paper is to study the modal logical character of Jeﬀrey accessibility in
a similar manner as it had been done in [7,11] with Bayes accessibility.
For monographic works on Bayesianism we refer to [6,19,32]; for papers
discussing basic aspects of Bayesianism, including conditionalization, see [14,
16–18,30,31]; for a discussion of Jeﬀrey’s conditionalization, see [10].
Two remarks are in order here. First, in the literature of probabilistic
updating apart from the Bayes and Jeﬀrey rules various other rules have been
studied to update a prior probability, such as entropy maximalization or min-
imalization principles among others. Conditionalizing is a concept and tech-
nique in probability theory that is much more general than the Bayes rule
(1.1) (also called “ratio formula” [25]). Both the Bayes rule and Jeﬀrey rule
are special cases of conditioning with respect to a σ-ﬁeld, see [4, Chapters
33–34] and [13] for further discussion of the relation of Bayes and Jeﬀrey rules
to the theory of conditionalization via conditional expectation determined by
σ-ﬁelds. We refer to [9] for a comparison of such methods.
Second, let us note here that there is a huge literature on other types
of belief revision as well. Without completeness we mention: the AGM postu-
lates in the seminal work of Alchurro´n–Ga¨rdenfors–Makinson [1]; the dynamic
epistemic logic [29]; van Benthem’s dynamic logic for belief revision [28]; prob-
abilistic logics, e.g. Nilsson [23]; and probabilistic belief logics [2]. Typically,
in this literature beliefs are modeled by sets of formulas deﬁned by the syntax
of a given logic and axioms about modalities are intended to prescribe how
a belief represented by a formula should be modiﬁed when new information
and evidence are provided. Viewed from the perspective of such theories of
belief revision our intention in this paper, following [7], is very diﬀerent. We
do not try to give a plausible set of axioms in some nicely designed logic to
capture desired features of (probabilistic) belief revision. On the contrary, we
take the model that is actually used in applications of probabilistic learning
theory and aim at an in-depth study of this model from a purely logical per-
spective. Bayesian probabilistic inference is relevant not only for belief change:
2 Finiteness of the partition does not play a crucial role here, in fact, it turns out from Sect.
3 that from the modal logical point of view allowing inﬁnite (countable) partitions does not
make any diﬀerence. See the discussion in Sect. 3.
Z. Gyenis Log. Univers.
Bayes and Jeﬀrey conditionalization are the typical and widely applied infer-
ence rules also in situations where probability is interpreted not as subjective
degree of belief but as representing objective matters of fact. Finding out the
logical properties of such types of probabilistic inference has thus a wide in-
terest going way beyond the conﬁnes of belief revision.
Below we recall the most important preliminary deﬁnitions from [7] and
deﬁne the central subjects of the present paper. Concerning notions in modal
logic we refer to the books Blackburn–Rijke–Venema [5] and Chagrov–
Zakharyaschev [8]. We take the standard unimodal language given by the
grammar
a | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ♦ϕ (1.3)
deﬁning formulas ϕ, where a belongs to a nonempty countable set Φ of propo-
sitional letters. We use more-or-less standard notation and terminology but to
be on the safe side the most basic concepts are recalled in the “Appendix”.
Formal background. For a measurable space 〈X,B〉 we denote by M(X,B)
the set of all probability measures over 〈X,B〉. M(X,B) serves as the set of
“possible worlds” in the Kripkean terminology and Bayes accessibility relation
has been deﬁned in [7] as follows: For v, w ∈ M(X,B) we say that w is Bayes
accessible from v if there is an A ∈ B such that w(·) = v( · | A). We denote the
Bayes accessibility relation on M(X,B) by R(X,B). [7] introduces the notion
of Bayes frames and Bayes logics:
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Bayes frames). A Bayes frame is a Kripke frame 〈W,R〉 that
is isomorphic, as a directed graph, to F(X,B) = 〈M(X,B), R(X,B)〉 for a
measurable space 〈X,B〉.
For convenience, we rely on the convention that elementary events {x} for
x ∈ X always belong to the algebra B; the reader can easily convince himself
that this convention can be bypassed for the purposes of this paper. As a result,
note that if the measurable space 〈X,B〉 is ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite, then B
must be the powerset algebra ℘(X). Therefore, in the countable case (i.e. when
X is countable) instead of writing F(X,℘(X)), M(X,℘(X)) or R(X,℘(X))
we sometimes simply write F(X), M(X) or R(X), respectively.
Deﬁnition 1.2 (Bayes logics). A family of normal modal logics have been de-
ﬁned in [7] based on ﬁnite or countable or countably inﬁnite or all Bayes frames
as follows.
BL<ω = {φ : (∀n ∈ N) F(n, ℘(n))  φ} (1.4)
BLω = {φ : F(ω, ℘(ω))  φ} (1.5)
BL≤ω = BL<ω ∩ BLω (1.6)
BL = {φ : (∀ Bayes frames F) F  φ} (1.7)
We call BL<ω (resp. BL≤ω) the logic of ﬁnite (resp. countable) Bayes frames;
however, observe that the set of possible worlds M(X,B) of a Bayes frame
F(X,B) is ﬁnite if and only if X is a one-element set, otherwise it is at least
of cardinality continuum.
On the Modal Logic
Bayes logics in Deﬁnition 1.2 capture the laws of Bayesian learning: BL<ω
is the set of general laws of Bayesian learning based on all ﬁnite Bayes frames,
while the general laws of Bayesian learning independent of the particular rep-
resentation 〈X,B〉 of the events is then the modal logic BL. The following
theorem has been proved in [7].3
Theorem 1.3. The following (non)containments hold.
• S4 ⊆ BL ⊆ BLω = BL≤ω  BL<ω,
• S4.1  BLω,
• S4.1 + Grz  BL<ω.
The logic of ﬁnite Bayes frames has completely been described in [7] and, in
particular, it has been shown that
• BL<ω has the ﬁnite frame property [7, Proposition 5.8],
• BL<ω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable [7, Propositions 5.9].
In a similar manner we deﬁne Jeﬀrey accessibility: Given two measures
p, q ∈ M(X,B) we say that q is Jeﬀrey accessible from p if there is a ﬁnite
partition {Ei}i<n and uncertain evidence ri assigned to this partition (ri ≥ 0,∑
i<n ri = 1, p(Ei) > 0) such that Eq. (1.2) holds. Denote the corresponding
accessibility relation by J(X,B).
Deﬁnition 1.4 (Jeﬀrey frames). A Jeﬀrey frame is a Kripke frame 〈W,R〉 that
is isomorphic, as a directed graph, to J (X,B) = 〈M(X,B), J(X,B)〉 for a
measurable space 〈X,B〉.
A remark similar as above applies here: if the underlying set X of the
measurable space 〈X,B〉 is countable, then we may write J (X) and J(X)
instead of the longer J (X,℘(X)) and J(X,℘(X)).
Deﬁnition 1.5 (Jeﬀrey logics). A family of normal modal logics is deﬁned for
a cardinal κ and  ∈ {=, <,≤} as follows.
JLκ = {φ : (for all 〈X,B〉 with |X|  κ) J (X,B)  φ} (1.8)
JL = {φ : (∀ Jeﬀrey frames J ) J  φ} (1.9)
We call JL<ω (resp. JLω) the logic of ﬁnite (resp. countable) Jeﬀrey frames
or sometimes we use the term “ﬁnite (resp. countable) Jeﬀrey logic”.
Jeﬀrey logics in Deﬁnition 1.5 capture the laws of Jeﬀrey updating: JL<ω
is the set of general laws of Jeﬀrey learning based on all ﬁnite Jeﬀrey frames,
while the general laws of Jeﬀrey learning independent of the particular repre-
sentation 〈X,B〉 of the events is then the modal logic JL.
From the point of view of applications of probabilistic updating the most
important classes of Bayes and Jeﬀrey frames are the ones determined by mea-
surable spaces 〈X,B〉 having a ﬁnite or a countably inﬁnite X. Taking the ﬁrst
steps, this paper focuses only on the case with countable X, nevertheless, ques-
tions similar to what we ask here could be raised in connection with standard
3 Some of the basic terminology of modal logic, such as what S4 is, is recalled in the
“Appendix”.
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Borel spaces, e.g. when B is the Borel (or Lebesgue) σ-algebra over the unit
interval X = [0, 1]. It seems that countability of X serves as a dividing line and
continuous spaces require diﬀerent techniques than the ones employed here (cf.
[11] where Bayes updating over standard Borel spaces was investigated).
Overview of the paper. Firstly, in Sect. 2 we discuss the connections of Jeﬀrey
logics to a list of modal axioms that are often considered in the literature. In
particular, Proposition 2.1 shows that JL  S4 but JL  M (thus JL  S4.1),
JL≤ω  S4.1 and JLκ  Grz for any  ∈ {=, <,≤} and κ > 1. Then,
Theorem 2.2 clariﬁes the containments between the diﬀerent Jeﬀrey logics:
S4 ⊆ JL ⊆ JLω = JL≤ω ⊆ JL<ω ⊆ JLn+k ⊆ JLn (1.10)
In Sect. 3 we prove that the logic of Jeﬀrey updating (in the countable
case) coincide with the logic of absolute continuity (see Theorem 3.7). The
interesting part is when X is countably inﬁnite: as a side result it turns out
that from the modal logical point of view it does not matter whether or not
we allow inﬁnite partitions in the Jeﬀrey formula (1.2). In other words, the
general laws that apply to Jeﬀrey learning are the same in both cases (and
coincide with that of absolute continuity).
In Sect. 4 we ask the question “how close Bayes and Jeﬀrey logics are?”
It turns out that ﬁniteness of X serves as a dividing line: there is a proper
containment
JLn  BLn and JL<ω  BL<ω (1.11)
The case with countably inﬁnite X, however, seems to show a completely
diﬀerent behavior. Theorem 4.6 disqualiﬁes a large class of normal modal logics
L that can possibly be put in between JLω  L  BLω. We also show
that JLω is indistinguishable from BLω within a large class of modal formulas
(Corollary 4.7). It seems that the standard techniques fail to make a distinction
between JLω and BLω and thus we conjecture that they are indeed the same.
This we articulated in Problem 4.8: Are the logics JLω and BLω the same?
Finally, Sect. 5 deals with ﬁnite axiomatizability of the logics JL<ω and
JLω. Theorem 5.8 states that the logic of ﬁnite Jeﬀrey frames JL<ω is not
ﬁnitely axiomatizable, while Theorem 5.16 claims the same non ﬁnite axioma-
tizability result for JLω (moreover countable Jeﬀrey logics are not axiomatiz-
able by any set of formulas using ﬁnitely many variables). The situation is thus
similar to that of Bayes logics (recall that BL<ω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable,
see [7, Propositions 5.9]). Such no-go results have a philosophical signiﬁcance:
they tell us that there is no ﬁnite set of formulas from which all general laws
of Bayesian belief revision and Bayesian learning based on probability spaces
with a countable set of propositions can be deduced. Bayesian learning and
belief revision based on such simple probability spaces are among the most
important instances of probabilistic updatings because they are widely used
in applications. If the axiomatic approach to belief revision is not capable to
characterize the logic of the simplest, paradigm form of belief revision, then
this casts doubt on the general enterprize that aims at axiomatizations of belief
revision systems. The cases with ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite X require diﬀerent
techniques, therefore this section is divided into two subsections, accordingly.
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2. Modal Principles of Jeﬀrey Updating
In this section we discuss the connections of Jeﬀrey logics to a list of modal
axioms that are often considered in the literature: the T , 4, M and Grz axioms
(see “Appendix”).
We claim ﬁrst that each Jeﬀrey frame is an S4-frame, that is, the acces-
sibility relation of the frame is reﬂexive and transitive. Take any Jeﬀrey frame
J (X,B) = 〈W,R〉. As we mentioned earlier Bayes conditioning is a special
case of Jeﬀrey conditioning. This immediately implies reﬂexivity of R as for
all probability measures w ∈ W we have w(·) = w( · | X). As for transitiv-
ity, suppose u, v, w ∈ W with uRv and vRw. Taking into account the Jeﬀrey
formula (1.2), we need two partitions {Ei} and {Fj} and uncertain evidences
ri and sj assigned to these partitions such that v(H) =
∑
i u(H | Ei)ri and
w(H) =
∑
j v(H | Fj)sj . Checking transitivity of R requires some eﬀorts but
only basic algebra is involved (such as reordering sums) and thus we skip the
lengthy calculations and only hint that one should take the common reﬁne-
ment {Ei∩Fj}i,j of the two partitions with suitable values ti,j calculated from
the values ri and sj . Consequently J (X,B)  S4 and therefore S4 ⊆ JL.
An S4-frame is an S4.1-frame if it validates the axiom M that requires
the existence of endpoints: the frame J (X,B) = 〈W,R〉 validates M if and
only if R has endpoints in the following sense:
∀w∃u(wRu ∧ ∀v(uRv → u = v)) (2.1)
If X is countable, then the Dirac measures δ{x} for x ∈ X are endpoints: take
any u ∈ W and pick x ∈ X such that u({x}) = 0. Then δ{x} = u( · | {x}).
It follows that S4.1 ⊆ JL≤ω. (We will see later on that this containment is
proper as JL≤ω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable).
On the other hand, we claim that M /∈ JL and consequently S4.1 ⊆ JL.
To this end it is enough to give an example for a Jeﬀrey frame J (X,B) in
which there are paths without endpoints. Consider the frame J ([0, 1],B) where
[0, 1] is the unit interval and B is the Borel σ-algebra. Then, for the Lebesgue
measure w we have
J ([0, 1],B) |= ∃u(wRu ∧ ∀v(uRv → u = v)) (2.2)
We note that none of the logics JLκ (for  ∈ {=, <,≤} and κ > 1)
contain the Grzegorczyk axiom Grz as a Jeﬀrey frame J always contains a
complete subgraph of cardinality continuum.
Summing up we get the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The following statements hold:
• JL  S4 but JL  M, in particular JL  S4.1.
• JL≤ω  S4.1.
• JLκ  Grz for any  ∈ {=, <,≤} and κ > 1. 
The containments between diﬀerent Jeﬀrey logics are clariﬁed in the next
theorem.
Z. Gyenis Log. Univers.
Theorem 2.2. The following containments hold.
S4 ⊆ JL ⊆ JLω = JL≤ω ⊆ JL<ω ⊆ JLn+k ⊆ JLn (2.3)
Proof. From the very deﬁnition the following containments are straightfor-
ward:
JL ⊆ JL≤ω ⊆ JL<ω ⊆ JLn and JL ⊆ JL≤ω ⊆ JLω (2.4)
Next we show JLm ⊆ JLn for m > n and JLω ⊆ JL<ω. The proof relies
on Lemma 2.3. If 〈X,B〉 and 〈Y,S〉 are measurable spaces, then we say that
〈X,B〉 can be embedded into 〈Y,S〉 (〈X,B〉 ↪→ 〈Y,S〉 in symbols) if there is
a surjective measurable function f : Y → X such that f−1 : B → S is a
σ-algebra homomorphism.
Lemma 2.3. If 〈X,B〉 ↪→ 〈Y,S〉, then J (Y,S)  J (X,B)
Proof. Let f : Y → X be a surjective measurable function (f−1 : B → S is
a σ-algebra homomorphism). For a probability measure p ∈ M(Y,S) let us
assign the probability measure F (p) ∈ M(X,B) deﬁned by the equation
F (p)(A) = p
(
f−1(A)
)
(A ∈ B) (2.5)
Then F : J (Y,S)  J (X,B) is a surjective bounded morphism. 
Now, for m > n we have J (m)  J (n) and J (ω)  J (n). Hence, the
containments JLm ⊆ JLn for m > n and JLω ⊆ JL<ω follow. We also obtain
JLω = JL≤ω as JL≤ω = JLω ∩ JL<ω. 
3. Relation to Absolute Continuity
Considering Eq. (1.2) [or even Eq. (1.1)] it is easy to see that q has value 0 on
every element H ∈ B which has p-probability zero. The technical expression
of this is that q is absolutely continuous with respect to p. Therefore absolute
continuity is necessary for Bayes or Jeﬀrey accessibility. In general, for p, q ∈
M(X,B) we say that q is absolutely continuous with respect to p (q  p in
symbols) if p(A) = 0 implies q(A) = 0 for all A ∈ B.
Let us now assume that X = {x0, . . . , xn−1} is ﬁnite and take any prob-
ability measure p ∈ M(X,℘(X)). If q ∈ M(X,℘(X)) is a probability measure
such that q  p, then by taking the partition Ei = {xi} for i < n and the
uncertain evidence ri = q(Ei), we get
q(H) =
∑
i<n
p(H | Ei)ri (3.1)
for all H ⊆ X. This means that given any prior probability p and an other
probability q that is absolutely continuous with respect to p, if the probability
space is ﬁnite, then q can be obtained from p by the Jeﬀrey rule. In other
words, absolute continuity and Jeﬀrey accessibility coincide in the ﬁnite case.
This motivates us to introduce Kripke frames where the accessibility relation
is deﬁned by absolute continuity, as follows.
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Deﬁnition 3.1. For a probability space 〈X,B〉 we deﬁne the Kripke frame
A(X,B) = 〈M(X,B),  〉 (3.2)
where  stands for absolute continuity: For probability measures p, q ∈ M(X,B)
we write p  q (or q  p) if p(A) = 0 implies q(A) = 0 for all A ∈ B.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Logics of Absolute Continuity). In a similar manner to Deﬁni-
tions 1.2 and 1.5 we deﬁne a family of normal modal logics based on absolute
continuity. Let κ be a cardinal and  ∈ {=, <,≤}.
ACLκ = {φ : (for all 〈X,B〉 with |X|  κ) A(X,B)  φ} (3.3)
ACL = {φ : (∀〈X,B〉) A(X,B)  φ} (3.4)
Our observation at the beginning of this section proves the next proposition.
Proposition 3.3. JLn = ACLn and JL<ω = ACL<ω for any n ∈ N.
Proof. For a ﬁnite X a probability measure q ∈ M(X,℘(X)) can be obtained
from p ∈ M(X,℘(X)) by means of Jeﬀrey conditionalizing if and only if p  q.
This implies that the frames A(X) and J (X) are identical. Consequently
ACLn = Λ(A(n)) = Λ(J (n)) = JLn, and ACL<ω =
⋂
n ACLn =
⋂
n JLn =
JL<ω. 
What about the countably inﬁnite case? The answer depends on whether
or not we allow inﬁnite partitions in the Jeﬀrey formula (1.2).
If we allow inﬁnite partitions in the Jeﬀrey formula (1.2) and X is count-
ably inﬁnite, say X = N, then taking the partition Ei = {i} and the values
ri = q({i}) for i ∈ N, Jeﬀrey formula leads to
q(H) =
∑
i∈N
p(H | Ei)ri (3.5)
for all H ∈ ℘(N), provided p, q ∈ M(N, ℘(N)) are such that p  q. This
immediately ensures that q is Jeﬀrey accessible from p if and only if q is
absolutely continuous with respect to p, and in particular JLω = ACLω.
There are good reasons, however, to keep the partition in the Jeﬀrey for-
mula ﬁnite. The requirement that the uncertain evidence is given by a proba-
bility measure on a proper, non-trivial partition can be important: otherwise,
as we have seen it, every probability measure can be obtained from itself as
evidence—a triviality. The recent paper [12] argues that even in the ﬁnite case
(i.e. when X is ﬁnite) it makes sense not to consider the trivial partition in the
Jeﬀrey rule [as we did in Eq. (3.1)]. However, by sticking to all proper parti-
tions in Jeﬀrey accessibility we would lost transitivity4 which is a well-desired
property in the context of learning theory. The natural way to overcome this
problem is to not allow all proper partitions but rather just the restricted
set of ﬁnite partitions. This way we can keep transitivity and also, as we will
shortly see, the inﬁnite Jeﬀrey logic JLω will still coincide with ACLω. In
other words, from the logical point of view whether or not we allow inﬁnite
4 The common reﬁnement of two proper partitions can lead to the trivial partition, see the
example in Figure 4 in [12].
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partitions in the Jeﬀrey rule (1.2) does not make any diﬀerence. The rest of
this section is devoted to prove this statement.
Recall that for a countable X, the support of a probability measure u ∈
M(X,℘(X)) is the set supp(u) = {x ∈ X : u({x}) = 0}.
Lemma 3.4. Let p, q, r be probability measures over the measure space 〈N, ℘(N)〉
and suppose that both q and r are Jeﬀrey accessible from p and supp(q) =
supp(r). Then r is Jeﬀrey accessible from q and vice versa.
Proof. Let p, q and r be as in the statement. According to Proposition 7.2, as
both q and r are Jeﬀrey accessible from p, we have that the Radon–Nikodym
derivatives dqdp and
dr
dp are step functions p-almost everywhere. As supp(q) =
supp(r), q and r are mutually absolutely continuous. In order to get that r is
Jeﬀrey accessible from q, it is enough (by Proposition 7.2 again) to check that
the Radon–Nikodym derivative drdq is a step function, q-almost everywhere. But
dr
dq =
dr
dp · dpdq except for a q-measure zero set, and it is straightforward that the
product of two step functions is a step function. That q is Jeﬀrey accessible
from r is completely similar. 
Proposition 3.5. JLω ⊆ ACLω.
Proof. It is enough to prove that A(ω)J (ω). Indeed, we claim that whenever
p ∈ J (ω) is a faithful measure (meaning that it has full support supp(p) = ω),
then the generated subframe J p is isomorphic to A(ω). For this we only need
that if q and r are Jeﬀrey accessible from p and supp(q) = supp(r), then r is
Jeﬀrey accessible from q and vice versa. This exactly is Lemma 3.4. 
Proposition 3.6. JLω ⊇ ACLω.
Proof. It is enough to prove that
⊎A(ω)  J (ω) for a suitable disjoint union⊎A(ω). Indeed, recall that ⊎A(ω)  J (ω) implies Λ(A(ω)) ⊆ Λ( ⊎A(ω)) ⊆
Λ
(J (ω)), that is, ACLω ⊆ JLω. The construction is as follows.
For a non-empty subset X ⊆ ω consider those probability measures in
J (ω) whose support is X and write
SX =
{
u ∈ M(ω, ℘(ω)) : supp(u) = X}. (3.6)
As the Jeﬀrey accessibility relation is transitive, SX can be partitioned into
clicks. A click is a maximal subset K of SX such that any two u, v ∈ K are
mutually Jeﬀrey accessible. Let KXα be an enumeration of the clicks of SX
(α < κX for some cardinal κX depending on X). Note that each KXα is either
a 1-element set or has continuum many elements depending on whether or not
X is a 1-element set.
For each α < κω take a disjoint copy Aα(ω) of A(ω) and write
AXα =
{
u ∈ Aα(ω) : supp(u) = X
}
. (3.7)
Note that each Aωα has continuum many elements.
Finally, take arbitrary bijections Fα : Aωα → Kωα (for α < κω) and let
F =
⋃
α<κω
Fα be the union of these bijections. As the copies Aωα are disjoint,
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F is a well-deﬁned bijection between
⋃
α A
ω
α and Sω (this latter set is taken as
a subset of J (ω)).
The content of Lemma 3.4 can be interpreted in our context as follows.
Take any probability p ∈ J (ω) with supp(p) = X. Suppose Y ⊆ X is a non-
empty subset and q, r are measures in J (ω) such that supp(q) = supp(r) = Y
and both q and r can be Jeﬀrey accessed from p. Then q and r must belong
to the same click of SY . It follows that F can be extended from
⋃
α A
ω
α to
the entire
⋃
α A(ω)α in a homomorphic way. Checking that this extension is
indeed a bounded morphism is not hard and left to the reader. 
Summing up, independently of whether or not we allow inﬁnite partitions
in the Jeﬀrey formula (1.2) we obtained the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. For all countable cardinals κ and  ∈ {=, <,≤} we have
JLκ = ACLκ. (3.8)
Proof. The equations JLn = ACLn for n ∈ ω and JL<ω = ACL<ω is Propo-
sition 3.3. Combining Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 we get JLω = ACLω. Finally,
JL≤ω = ACL≤ω follows from the previous results and the deﬁnition. 
This result enables us to use the frames A(n) and A(ω) instead of the
more complex Jeﬀrey frames J (n) and J (ω).
4. How Close Bayes and Jeﬀrey Logics Are?
One of the main results in [7] is Theorem 5.2 which relates Bayes logics to
the strongest modal companion of Medvedev’s logic of ﬁnite problems. We
start by recalling deﬁnitions and theorems from [7,26]. Medvedev’s logic of
ﬁnite problems and its extension to inﬁnite problems by Skvortsov originate in
intuitionistic logic. (For an overview we refer to the book [8] and to Shehtman
[26]; Medvedev’s logic of ﬁnite problems is covered in the papers [15,20,21,24,
26,27].)
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Medvedev frames). A Medvedev frame is a frame that is iso-
morphic (as a directed graph) to 〈℘(X)  {∅},⊇〉 for a non-empty ﬁnite set
X.
For convenience, as a slight abuse of notation, we will call every frame of the
form 〈℘(X)  {∅},⊇〉 (X being ﬁnite or inﬁnite) a Medvedev frame and we
will use the notation
P0X = 〈℘(X)  {∅},⊇〉 (4.1)
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A hierarchy or normal modal logics that correspond to the frames P0X can be
given:
MLn =
{
φ : P0n  φ
}
(4.2)
ML<ω =
{
φ : (∀n ∈ N) P0n  φ
}
(4.3)
MLω =
{
φ : P0ω  φ
}
(4.4)
ML≤ω = ML<ω ∩ MLω (4.5)
ML =
⋂
α
MLα (4.6)
Observe that for α < β we have P0α  P0β , consequently MLβ ⊆ MLα.
Since there are countably many modal formulas and proper class many cardi-
nals, there must exists a cardinal α0 such that the sequence MLα stabilizes,
i.e. ML = MLα0 or equivalently for all β ≥ α0 we have MLβ = MLα0 .
Theorem 5.2 of [7] states the containments below.
ML ⊆ MLω = ML≤ω  ML<ω  MLn
 = = = =
BL  BLω = BL≤ω  BL<ω  BLn
(4.7)
A consequence of this result is that when the underlying set X of the
measurable space is countable we can use the more easy-to-handle Medvedev
frames instead of Bayes frames.
Lemma 4.2. For a countable X the mapping f : A(X)  P0(X) deﬁned by
f(p) = supp(p) (4.8)
is a surjective bounded morphism.
Proof. Surjectivity of f is straightforward. f is a homomorphism (preserves
accessibility) because for p, q ∈ M(X,℘(X)) we have p  q if and only if
supp(p) ⊇ supp(q). To verify the zig-zag property, suppose supp(p) ⊇ A. We
need q ∈ M(X,℘(X)) such that p  q and supp(q) = A. Finding such a q is
easy, take for example the conditional probability q(·) = p(· | A). 
Corollary 4.3. ACLκ ⊆ MLκ holds for  ∈ {=, <,≤} and κ countable.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4.2. 
Corollary 4.4. JLκ ⊆ BLκ holds for  ∈ {=, <,≤} and κ countable.
Proof. Combine Corollary 4.3, Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 5.2. in [7]. 
We note that none of the logics ACLn (for n > 1) contain the Grzegor-
czyk axiom Grz as A(n) always contain a complete subgraph of cardinality
continuum. It is easy to check that Medvedev frame over a ﬁnite set P0(n)
validate Grz, that is, Grz ∈ BL<ω. Therefore we get
JLn  BLn and JL<ω  BL<ω (4.9)
To have all the containments between Bayes and Jeﬀrey logics the only
question remained is whether JLω = BLω. (By Corollary 4.4 we know that
JLω ⊆ BLω.) The Grzegorczyk axiom does not diﬀerentiate between JLω and
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BLω as none of these logics contain the formula Grz. In fact, we prove that
JLω is indistinguishable from BLω within a large class of modal formulas.
On the other hand the standard techniques (generated subframes, bounded
morphisms) to prove the equality of the two logics do not seem to work: none
of A(ω)  P0(ω) or ⊎P0(ω)  A(ω) holds.
We call a Kripke frame F click free if there are no two diﬀerent worlds
in F that are mutually accessible, i.e. the largest click in F has size at most
one. Note that click freeness enables reﬂexive points.
Lemma 4.5. Let F be a click free S4-frame. Then P0(ω)  F if and only if
A(ω)  F .
Proof. (⇒) The claim that P0(ω)  F implies A(ω)  F is straightforward
as any bounded morphism f : P0(ω)  F can be lifted up to a bounded
morphism f+ : A(ω)  F by letting f+(p) .= f(supp(p)) for p ∈ M(ω, ℘(ω)).
(⇐) That A(ω)  F implies P0(ω)  F can be veriﬁed by observing
that click freeness of F ensures that all points of a click in A(ω) must be
mapped to the same point of F . Thus any morphism f : A(ω)  F can be
pushed down to a morphism f− : P0  F by letting for all ∅ = X ⊆ ω,
f−(X) .= f(p) for any p ∈ M(ω, ℘(ω)) with supp(p) = X. 
Theorem 4.6. There is no normal modal logic L such that
JLω  L  BLω (4.10)
and L is the logic of a click free S4-frame F with A(ω)  F .
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4.5. 
The previous theorem tells us that if we would like to distinguish JLω
from BLω, then the standard technique of ﬁnding a bounded morphic image of
A(ω) that does the distinction fails (provided that this bounded morphic image
is transitive and click free). We note that every modal formula is validated
on a suitable ﬁnite, transitive, click free frame, thus Theorem 4.6 gives the
impression that the two logics JLω and BLω coincide. Applying the same
technique the next Corollary tells us that JLω is indistinguishable from BLω
within a large class of modal formulas called Jankov—de Jongh formulas (cf.
Theorem 7.1 in the “Appendix”).
Corollary 4.7. For a transitive, click free frame F we have
χF ∈ JLω ⇔ χF ∈ BLω (4.11)
Proof. Combine Lemma 4.5 with Theorem 7.1. 
We end this section by an open problem.
Problem 4.8. Are the logics JLω and BLω the same?
Part of the question in Problem 4.8 is this: Is there any frame F such
that A(ω)  F but P0(ω)  F? Such a frame F must contain a proper click
(must not be click free).
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5. Non Finite Axiomatizability
For a natural number l a logic L is l-axiomatizable if it has an axiomatization
using only formulas whose propositional variables are among p1, . . . , pl. Every
ﬁnitely axiomatizable logic is l-axiomatizable for a suitable l: take l to be the
maximal number of variables the ﬁnitely many axioms in question use.
The main message of this section is that countable Jeﬀrey logics JL<ω,
JLω and JL≤ω are not ﬁnitely axiomatizable. In fact, it turns out from the
proof that they cannot even be axiomatized with (possibly inﬁnitely many)
formulas using the same ﬁnitely many propositional letters. Thus, these logics
are not ﬁnite schema axiomatizable either. The ﬁnite and the countably inﬁnite
cases require slightly diﬀerent techniques, therefore we split the proof into two
subsections, accordingly.
Also recall that the logic of countable Jeﬀrey frames is proved to be equal
to that of absolute continuity (see Theorem 3.7). This allows us to use the
frames A(X) of absolute continuity rather than the more complicated Jeﬀrey
frames J (X). Phrasing it diﬀerently: we in fact show that the logics ACL<ω,
ACLω and ACL≤ω are not ﬁnitely axiomatizable and then refer to the fact
that JLκ = ACLκ for all countable cardinals κ and  ∈ {=, <,≤} (see
Theorem 3.7).
5.1. The Finite Case
We aim at proving ACL<ω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable. We show ﬁrst that
ACL<ω is a logic of ﬁnite frames, thus it has the ﬁnite frame property.
For each k, n ∈ N we deﬁne the ﬁnite frame Ak(n) as follows. Take
the frame A(n). For each non-singleton set A ⊆ n the frame A(n) con-
tains a complete subgraph of cardinality continuum (measures p with support
supp(p) = A). Replace this inﬁnite complete graph with the complete graph
on k vertices and keep everything else ﬁxed. A more precise deﬁnition is the
following.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let n, k > 0 be natural numbers. For each non-singleton set
a ∈ ℘(n) − {∅} take new distinct points [a]1, . . . , [a]k, and for each singleton
a ∈ ℘(n) take [a]1 = · · · = [a]k to be a single new point. The set of possible
worlds of the frame Ak(n) is the set
Ak(n) =
{
[a]1, . . . , [a]k : a ∈ ℘(n) − {∅}
}
(5.1)
For two points [a]i, [b]j ∈ Ak(n) we deﬁne the accessibility relation → as
[a]i → [b]j if and only if a ⊇ b (5.2)
Lemma 5.2. For all n and k we have A(n)  Ak(n).
Proof. For a measure p ∈ M(n) the support supp(p) is a non-empty subset
of n, therefore [supp(p)]1, . . ., [supp(p)]k are elements of Ak(n). Take any
mapping f : M(n) → Ak(n) such that
f(p) = [supp(p)]i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (5.3)
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and f is a surjection. Such a mapping clearly exists as for each a ∈ ℘(n)−{∅}
we have
|{p : supp(p) = a}| = 2ℵ0 > k (5.4)
We claim that f is a surjective bounded morphism:
Homomorphism. Take p, q ∈ M(n) and suppose f(p) = [supp(p)]i, f(q) =
[supp(q)]j . Then p  q if and only if supp(p) ⊇ supp(q) if and only if
[supp(p)]i → [supp(q)]j .
Zag property. Assume f(p) → [a]i for some a ∈ ℘(n) − {∅}. This can be
the case if and only if supp(p) ⊇ a. By surjectivity of f there is q such that
f(q) = [a]i, whence supp(p) ⊇ supp(q) which means p  q. 
Lemma 5.3. For each modal formula ϕ there is k ∈ N such that A(n)  ϕ
implies Ak(n)  ϕ.
Proof. We prove that if ϕ uses the propositional letters p1, . . . , pk only, then
A(n)  ϕ implies A2k(n)  ϕ. If A(n)  ϕ, then there is an evaluation V such
that the model 〈A(n), V 〉  ϕ. The truth of a formula in a model depends
only on the evaluation of the propositional letters the formula uses, therefore
we may assume that V is restricted to p1, . . ., pk.
For x ∈ A(n) we deﬁne a 0–1 sequence of length k according to whether
x ∈ V (pi) holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
Px(i) =
{
1 if x ∈ V (pi)
0 otherwise. (1 ≤ i ≤ k) (5.5)
As there are 2k diﬀerent 0–1 sequences of length k, the number of possible
Px’s is at most 2k.
Take any surjective mapping f : A(n) → A2k(n) such that
f(x) = [supp(x)]i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (5.6)
and for x, y ∈ A(n) with supp(x) = supp(y) we have
Px = Py implies f(x) = f(y) (5.7)
Such a mapping f must exist as for each non-singleton a ∈ ℘(n)−{∅} we have
2k elements [a]1, . . ., [a]2k in A2k(n), and this is the number of the possible
Px’s. Let us now deﬁne the evaluation V ′ over A2k(n) by
V ′(pi) = {f(x) : x ∈ V (pi)} (5.8)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Condition (5.7) ensures that if x and y agree on p1, . . . , pk, then
so do the images f(x) and f(y). Thus, V ′ is well-deﬁned. Following the proof
of 5.2 one obtains that
f : 〈A(n), V 〉  〈A2k(n), V ′〉 (5.9)
is a surjective bounded morphism. As 〈A(n), V 〉  ¬ϕ we arrive at 〈A2k(n), V ′〉 
¬ϕ. This means A2k(n)  ϕ. 
Proposition 5.4. ACL<ω =
⋂∞
n=1
⋂∞
k=1 Λ (Ak(n)).
Z. Gyenis Log. Univers.
Proof. By combining Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 the equality
∞⋂
n=1
Λ (A(n)) =
∞⋂
n=1
∞⋂
k=1
Λ (Ak(n)) (5.10)
follows immediately. The left-hand side of the equation is the deﬁnition of
ACL<ω. 
Corollary 5.5. Finite Jeﬀrey logic JL<ω has the ﬁnite frame property.
Proof. JL<ω = ACL<ω by Theorem 3.7 and thus Proposition 5.4 implies
JL<ω =
∞⋂
n=1
∞⋂
k=1
Λ (Ak(n)) (5.11)
As each frame Ak(n) is ﬁnite, the proof is complete. 
Proposition 5.6. Let K be a class of ﬁnite, transitive frames, closed under
point-generated subframes. For every ﬁnite, transitive, point-generated frame
F we have
F  Λ(K) if and only if ∃(G ∈ K) G  F . (5.12)
Proof. (⇐) If there is G ∈ K such that G  F , then Λ(K) ⊆ Λ(G) ⊆ Λ(F).
(⇒) By way of contradiction suppose G  F for all G ∈ K. Then by
Theorem 7.1 we have G  χ(F) for all G ∈ K, in particular, χ(F) ∈ Λ(K). It
is straightforward to see that F  χ(F), thus F  Λ(K). 
Theorem 5.7. ACL<ω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable.
Proof. A logic L is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable if and only if for any formula
φ ∈ L there is a frame Fφ such that Fφ  L but Fφ  φ.
We will use the proof that the modal counterpart of Medvedev’s logic of
ﬁnite problems, ML<ω, is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable. We refer to [26] where
it has been proved that for each modal formula φ ∈ ML<ω there is a ﬁnite,
transitive, point-generated frame Gφ such that Gφ  φ while Gφ  ML<ω. The
construction therein is such that Gφ is click free.
We intend to show that Gφ  ACL<ω. This is enough because ACL<ω ⊂
ML<ω. By Proposition 5.4 ACL<ω is the logic of the class K = {Ak(n) :
n, k ∈ N} of ﬁnite, transitive frames, closed under point-generated subframes.
Therefore, to show Gφ  ACL<ω, by Proposition 5.6 it is enough to prove
that Gφ is not a bounded morphic image of any Ak(n). Suppose, seeking a
contradiction, that there exists a bounded morphism f : Ak(n)  Gφ. Then
for each a ∈ ℘(n) − {∅} the elements [a]1, . . ., [a]k should be mapped into the
same point xa in Gφ. This is because the points [a]i are all accessible from each
other, while in Gφ there are no non-singleton sets in which points are mutually
accessible. It follows that f induces a bounded morphism f∗ : P0(n) → Gφ from
the Medvedev frame P0(n) into Gφ by letting f∗(a) = xa for a ∈ ℘(n) − {∅}.
But this is impossible as Gφ  ML<ω. 
Theorem 5.8. Finite Jeﬀrey logic JL<ω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable.
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Proof. JL<ω = ACL<ω by Theorem 3.7 and this latter logic is not ﬁnitely
axiomatizable by Theorem 5.7. 
5.2. The Countably Inﬁnite Case
To gain non ﬁnite axiomatizability results for the countable Jeﬀrey logic JLω
we follow the method presented in Shehtman [26] and we recall the most
important lemmas that we make use of.
Deﬁnition 5.9 [26]. For m > 0 and k > 2 the Chinese lantern is the S4-frame
C(k,m) formed by the set
{(i, j) : (1 ≤ i ≤ k−2, 0 ≤ j ≤ 1) or (i = k−1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m) OR (i = k, j = 0)}
(5.13)
with the accessibility relation being an ordering:
(i, j) ≤ (i′, j′) iﬀ (i, j) = (i′, j′) OR i > i′ (5.14)
C(m, k) is illustrated on page 373 in [26], however, we will not need any
particular information about C apart from two lemmas that we recall below.
Lemma 5.10 (Lemma 22 in [26]). Let φ be a modal formula using l variables
and let m > 2l. Then C(k,m)  φ implies C(k, 2l)  φ.
Lemma 5.11 (Lemma 24 in [26]). For any n > 1 we have C(2n, 2n)  ML<ω.
Let F = 〈W,≤〉 be a ﬁnite ordering (partially ordered set) and pick
x ∈ W . y is an immediate successor of x if x < y and there is no x < z < y.
(As usual < means ≤ ∩ =). The branch index bF (x) is the cardinality of the
set of immediate successors of x, and the depth dF (x) is the least upper bound
of cardinalities of chains in F whose least element is x. Thus, dF (x) = 1 means
that x has no immediate successors. F is duplicate-free if it is ﬁnite, generated
and bF (u) = 1 for any u ∈ W (cf. Shehtman [26]).
Lemma 5.12. P0(ω)  C(k, 2k).
Proof. This is essentially Lemma 17 in [26]. Note that C(k,m) is duplicate-
free. The point u = (k, 0) in C(k, 2k) has depth d(u) = k and branch index
b(u) = 2k. If there were P0(ω)  C(k, 2k), then by Lemma 17 in [26] we would
have b(u) < 2d(u) which is impossible. 
Theorem 5.13. Let L be a normal modal logic with S4 ⊆ L ⊆ ML<ω. Suppose
that for every l ≥ 1 and k > l there is n ≥ k such that χ(C(k, 2n)) ∈ L. Then
L is not l-axiomatizable for any number l.
Proof. By way of contradiction suppose L is l-axiomatizable, that is, L =
S4+Σ where Σ is a set of formulas that can use only the ﬁrst l propositional
variables. Let k = 2l. By assumption there is n ≥ k so that χ(C(k, 2n)) ∈
L. That Σ axiomatizes L means that every formula in L can be derived (in
the normal modal calculus) from a ﬁnite set of axioms from Σ. Therefore
there is an l-formula φ ∈ L such that χ(C(k, 2n)) ∈ S4 + φ. This implies, by
Theorem 7.1(B), that C(k, 2n)  φ. As n ≥ k = 2l > l, Lemma 5.10 ensures
C(k, 2l)  φ. In particular, C(k, 2l)  L.
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On the other hand Lemma 5.10 implies (as k = 2l) that C(k, 2l)  ML<ω.
By assumption L ⊆ ML<ω so it follows that C(k, 2l)  L which is a contra-
diction. 
Corollary 5.14. Let F be a frame, L = Λ(F) and assume S4 ⊆ L ⊆ ML<ω.
Suppose for any k ≥ 1 there is n ≥ k such that for all u ∈ F we have
Fu  C(k, 2n). Then L is not l-axiomatizable for any ﬁnite number l.
Proof. Under the given assumptions Theorem 7.1(A) implies that for all k ≥ 1
there is n ≥ k so that χ(C(k, 2n)) ∈ L. Then Theorem 5.13 applies. 
Theorem 5.15. ACLω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable (in fact, it is not l-axioma-
tizable for any ﬁnite number l).
Proof. We intend to apply Corollary 5.14. ACLω = Λ(A(ω)) and the contain-
ments S4 ⊆ ACLω ⊆ ML<ω hold (see Theorem 2.2). Write A = A(ω). In
order to use Corollary 5.14 we only need to verify that for any k ≥ 1 there
is n ≥ k such that for all u ∈ A we have Au  C(k, 2n). It is easy to see
that for all u ∈ A, Au is isomorphic either to A(ω) or to A(n) depending
on whether or not u has an inﬁnite support. Therefore it is enough to check
A  C(k, 2k). As C(k, 2k) is a transitive, click free frame, according to Lemma
4.5 if A  C(k, 2k), then we also have P0(ω)  C(k, 2k). But this latter is
impossible by Lemma 5.12. 
Theorem 5.16. Countable Jeﬀrey logic JLω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable (in
fact, it is not l-axiomatizable for any ﬁnite number l).
Proof. JLω = ACLω by Theorem 3.7 and this latter logic is not ﬁnitely ax-
iomatizable by Theorem 5.15. 
6. Closing Words and Further Research Directions
Our aim was to study the modal logical character of Jeﬀrey accessibility in
a similar manner as it has been done in [7,11] concerning Bayes accessibility.
We have seen that the modal logic of Jeﬀrey learning always extends S4, and
extends S4.1 only if the underlying measurable space is countable (see Propo-
sition 2.1). Containments between the diﬀerent Jeﬀrey logics were clariﬁed in
Theorem 2.2:
S4 ⊆ JL ⊆ JLω = JL≤ω ⊆ JL<ω ⊆ JLn+k ⊆ JLn. (6.1)
and the relations of Jeﬀrey logics to Bayes logics were also drawn in Sect. 4:
JLn  BLn and JL<ω  BL<ω (6.2)
Equality between JLω and BLω remained open. Theorem 4.6 and Corollary 4.7
hints that they might be equal and in Problem 4.8 we ask whether the logics
JLω and BLω coincide.
We regard Sect. 5 the main result of the paper. Theorem 5.8 states that
the logic of ﬁnite Jeﬀrey frames JL<ω is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable, while Theo-
rem 5.16 claims the same non ﬁnite axiomatizability result for JLω (moreover
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countable Jeﬀrey logics are not axiomatizable by any set of formulas using
ﬁnitely many variables). The picture is thus analogous to that of Bayes logics,
see [7, Propositions 5.9]. The signiﬁcance of these results is that they clearly
indicate that axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be severely limited.
It is a longstanding open question whether the strongest modal compan-
ion of Medvedev’s logic of ﬁnite problems ML<ω (and thus Bayes logic BL<ω)
is recursively axiomatizable (see [8, Chapter 2]). Since the class of Medvedev
frames is a recursive class of ﬁnite frames, BL<ω is co-recursively enumerable.
It follows that if ML<ω is recursively axiomatizable, then BL<ω is decidable.
According to Corollary 5.5 ﬁnite Jeﬀrey logic JL<ω has the ﬁnite frame prop-
erty. The proof reveals that JL<ω is a logic of a recursive class of ﬁnite frames,
thus JL<ω is co-recursively enumerable, as well. We are not aware any simi-
lar result for JLω, neither do we know whether Jeﬀrey logics are recursively
axiomatizable. We conjecture that recursive axiomatizability of Jeﬀrey logics
would solve the similar question for Medvedev’s logic, thus the problem might
be severely hard.
Problem 6.1. Are any of the logics JL<ω and JLω recursively axiomatizable?
Finally, we have already mentioned that in the literature of probabilis-
tic updating apart from the Bayes and Jeﬀrey rules various other rules have
been studied to update a prior probability, such as entropy maximalization or
minimalization principles, among others. We do believe that a similar anal-
ysis should be carried out when Bayes or Jeﬀrey accessibility is replaced by
some other accessibility relation based on these various probability updating
principles.
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7. Appendix
ω is the least inﬁnite cardinal (that is, the set of natural numbers). By a
frame we always understand a Kripke frame, that is, a structure of the form
F = 〈W,R〉, where W is a non-empty set (of possible worlds) and R ⊆ W ×W
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a binary relation (accessibility). Kripke models are tuples M = 〈W,R, [| · |]〉
based on frames F = 〈W,R〉, and [| · |] : Φ → ℘(W ) is an evaluation of
propositional letters. Truth of a formula ϕ at world w is deﬁned in the usual
way by induction:
• M, w  p ⇐⇒ w ∈ [| p |] for propositional letters p ∈ Φ.
• M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w  ϕ AND M, w  ψ.
• M, w  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w  ϕ.
• M, w  ♦ϕ ⇐⇒ there is v such that wRv and M, v  ϕ.
Formula ϕ is valid over a frame F (F  ϕ in symbols) if and only if it is true
at every point in every model based on the frame. For a class C of frames the
modal logic of C is the set of all modal formulas that are valid on every frame
in C:
Λ(C) =
{
φ : (∀F ∈ C) F  φ} (7.1)
Λ(C) is always a normal modal logic. Let us recall the most standard list of
modal axioms (frame properties) that are often considered in the literature
(cf. [5,8]). Such axioms are
K (φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ)
T φ → φ
4 φ → φ
M ♦φ → ♦φ
Grz ((φ → φ) → φ) → φ
Let us recall some of the standard frame properties corresponding to these
axioms (cf. [5,8]).
Logic Axioms Adequate frames
K K All frames
T K+T Reﬂexive frames
4 K+4 Transitive frames
S4 K+T+4 Preorders
S4.1 K+T+4+M Preorders in which every point sees an endpoint
S4.Grz K+T+4+Grz Preorders without inﬁnite chains
For two frames F = 〈W,R〉 and G = 〈W ′, R′〉 we write F G if F is (iso-
morphic as a frame to) a generated subframe of G. We recall that if FG, then
G  φ implies F  φ, whence Λ(G) ⊆ Λ(F) (see Theorem 3.14 in [5] where the
symbol  was used instead of ). If w ∈ W , then we write Fw to denote the
subframe of F generated by w, and we call such subframes point-generated
subframes. Further, let F  G denote a surjective, bounded morphism (some-
times called p-morphisms). Such morphisms preserve the accessibility relation
and have the zig-zag property (see [5]). Recall that if F  G, then F  φ
implies G  φ, hence Λ(F) ⊆ Λ(G) (see Theorem 3.14 in [5]). We also recall
that (∀i) Fi  φ implies
⊎Fi  φ (for the deﬁnition of the disjoint union
⊎
of
frames see Deﬁnition 3.13 in [5]). In the special case when Fi = F it follows
that Λ(F) ⊆ Λ(⊎F) (Theorem 3.14 in [5]).
The next theorem is due to Jankov and de Jongh.
On the Modal Logic
Theorem 7.1 (cf. Proposition 4 in [26]). Let F be a generated ﬁnite S4-frame.
Then there is a modal formula χ(F) with the following properties:
(A) For any S4-frame G we have G  χ(F) if and only if ∃u Gu  F .
(B) For any logic L ⊇ S4 we have L ⊆ Λ(F) if and only if χ(F) /∈ L.
Let X be countable and consider probability measures p, q ∈ M(X,℘(X)).
Suppose that q is absolutely continuous to p. The Radon–Nikodym derivative
dq
dp can be expressed as
dq
dp
(x) =
{
q({x})
p({x}) if p({x}) = 0
∗ otherwise.
where ∗ denotes any value ( dqdp is determined up to p-measure zero, only). This
is because
∑
x∈A
f(x)q({x}) =
∫
A
f dq =
∫
A
f
dq
dp
dp =
∑
x∈A
f(x)
q({x})
p({x})p({x})
Proposition 7.2. Let X be a countable set and consider probability measures
p, q ∈ M(X,℘(X)). The following are equivalent
(a) q is Jeﬀrey accessible from p: there is a ﬁnite partition {Ei}i of X such
that p(Ei) = 0 and
q(H) =
∑
i
p(H | Ei)q(Ei) for all H ⊆ X
(b) q is absolutely continuous with respect to p and the range of the function
dq
dp is ﬁnite except for a p-measure zero set.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose q is Jeﬀrey accessible from p, that is, there is a ﬁnite
partition {Ei}i<n of X with p(Ei) = 0 and a probability measure r : {Ei} →
[0, 1] such that
q(H) =
∑
i<n
p(H ∩ Ei)
p(Ei)
r(Ei) (H ∈ S) (7.2)
As p(H) = 0 implies q(H) = 0, q is absolutely continuous with respect to
p. Suppose for some i < n there are a, b ∈ Ei which are not p-measure zero
elementary events. Then by (7.2) we have
q({a}) = p({a})
p(Ei)
r(Ei), q({b}) = p({b})
p(Ei)
r(Ei) =⇒ q({a})
p({a}) =
q({b})
p({b})
This shows that dqdp is constant on each Ei (p-almost everywhere).
(⇐) Let X+ = {x ∈ X : p({x}) > 0} and X0 = X  X+. By q  p it
follows that the Radon–Nikodym derivative dqdp exists and by assumption it is
a step function on X+. Deﬁne
Ey =
{
x ∈ X+ : q({x})
p({x}) = y
}
for y ∈ ran
(
dq
dp
)
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Then {Ey}y∈ran(dq/dp) is a ﬁnite partition of X+ and dqdp is constant on each
block Ey of this partition. Pick an arbitrary Ey and replace it by Ey ∪ X0
(we need to have a partition of X such that the blocks of this partition are
not p-measure zero, thus we can get rid of X0 by adding it to any block Ey).
For convenience we denote this new block by the same letter Ey. Deﬁne a
measure r on the σ-subalgebra generated by the partition {Ey}y∈ran(dq/dp) by
the equation
r(Ey) = y · p(Ey).
Note that r deﬁnes a probability measure because
∑
y∈ran(dq/dp)
r(Ey) =
∑
y
y · p(Ey) =
∑
y
y
∑
x∈Ey
p({x})
=
∑
x∈X
dq
dp
(x)p({x}) =
∑
X
q({x}) = 1
We claim that
q(H) =
∑
y∈ran(dq/dp)
p(H ∩ Ey)
p(Ey)
r(Ey) (for H ∈ S)
For all x ∈ X there is a unique j such that x ∈ Ej . Therefore
∑
y
p({x} ∩ Ey)
p(Ey)
r(Ey) =
p({x})
p(Ej)
r(Ej) = q({x})
This latter equation holds because x ∈ Ej iﬀ dqdp (x) = j iﬀ q({x})p({x}) = j, conse-
quently
r(Ej) = j · p(Ej) = q({x})
p({x})p(Ej)
This completes the proof. 
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